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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
RAYMOND FLORES SILVAZ : Case No. 20020298-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
INTRODUCTION 
In a memorandum decision dated February 6, 2003, this Court ruled that because 
appellate counsel failed to adequately brief the issues it refused to address the merits of 
Mr. Silvaz's challenges to the Internet enticement statute, Utah Code Annotated section 
76-4-401 (Supp. 2002). Addendum A at 2. In doing so, this Court misapplied case law 
on adequate briefing and created an impossible standard. Consistent with Utah law, the 
briefs identified the relevant issues, cited the applicable law, and applied that law to the 
Internet enticement statute. Instead of addressing the analysis raised in the briefs, this 
Court focused on other potential discussions that could have been included but which 
were not. In doing so, this Court raised the threshold required for adequate briefing to 
require a new level that approaches "perfect" briefing. 
In refusing to address the merits of Mr. Silvaz's arguments, this Court also failed 
to appreciate that this Court's decision effectively deprived Mr. Silvaz of his appeal 
rights. If, indeed, the briefing was inadequate, this Court could have employed less 
drastic measures, such as ordering re-briefing or the appointment of new counsel, 
without affecting Mr. Silvaz's appeal rights. Because of this Court's misapplication of 
the law, Mr. Silvaz requests this Court to rehear this appeal. 
I. APPELLANT'S BRIEFS SUFFICIENTLY ALERTED 
THIS COURT TO THE RELEVANT ISSUES AND LAW 
This Court should rehear this appeal because appellate counsel identified the 
applicable law and explained the grounds for invalidating the Internet enticement statute. 
On appeal, appellants have a duty to provide "the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "Briefs must contain reasoned analysis 
based upon relevant legal authority." Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App 370,1f8, 995 P.2d 14. 
After listing the applicable law, appellants must provide "grounds for comparison to the 
facts of the Appellant's case." IcL at Tfl 1. "While failure to cite to pertinent authority may 
not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when the overall analysis of 
the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court." State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). 
Mr. Silvaz's briefs complied with these requirements. The briefs principally 
attacked the plain language of the Internet enticement statute as creating an irreconcilable 
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conflict. After quoting the Internet enticement statute, the opening brief argues that the 
plain language of that statute was "'patently inconsistent'" because it "requires the State 
to prove that a person has used a computer to solicit a minor or attempted to do so but has 
not committed an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation crime." Opening Brief at 23-24 
(quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995)). The brief then 
cites the relevant case law on interpreting statutes which requires courts ,unot to look 
beyond the plain language'" of statutes. Opening Brief at 24 (quoting In re Worthen, 926 
P.2d 853, 866 (1996)). Relying on this case law, the brief argued that the plain language 
of the Internet enticement statute "create[d] an irreconcilable contradiction" because it 
requires the State to prove both the existence of an attempt or solicitation and the 
nonexistence of those very same acts. Opening Brief at 23-24. Finally, the brief likened 
this language to the statute in Nelson and applied Nelson's holding that appellate courts 
must invalidate contradictory statutes and refer them to the legislature for amendment. 
Opening Brief at 23-24 (citing Nelson. 905 P.2d at 875-76). 
Thus, the opening brief identified the issue raised and included "reasoned analysis 
based upon relevant legal authority" that the plain language of the Internet enticement 
statute was contradictory. Smith. 1999 UT App 370,1f8, 995 P.2d 14. The brief then 
applied that authority to the conflicting language of the statute and requested this Court to 
return the statute to the legislature. Id at ^[11. Nothing more was needed to meet the 
threshold for adequate briefing. Thomas. 961 P.2d at 305. While this Court may have 
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desired additional analysis, the briefs satisfactorily identified the issues, cited the relevant 
law, and applied that law to the statute in question. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Despite the adequacy of the briefs, this Court faulted the briefs for failing "to cite 
the attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation statutes." Addendum A at 2. This conclusion 
,foverlook[s]" the content of the briefs and "misapprehendfs]" the issue presented on 
appeal. Utah R. App. P. 35(a). First, the briefs included "citations to the [relevant] 
authorities" since the Internet enticement statute, as quoted in the opening brief and 
discussed in the reply, lists the citations to the attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation 
statutes. Opening Brief at 23 (quoting Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9)); Reply 
Brief at 4-6. Hence, the briefs did not fail to cite to those provisions. 
Second Mr. Silvaz did not quote the attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation statutes 
because they were not relevant to his plain language analysis. The Internet enticement 
statute creates patently inconsistent requirements that a crime "not amount[] to an 
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation under Section 76-4-101, 76-4-201, or 76-4-203," but 
then defines a crime for using a computer "to solicit seduce, lure or entice, or attempt to 
solicit seduce, lure or entice a minor" to engage is prohibited sexual activity. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2002) (quoted in Opening Brief at 23) (emphasis added). 
Because Mr. Silvaz argued that these words were plainly conflicting, there was no need to 
quote the attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation statutes. Appellate courts "need not look 
beyond the plain language" of statutes. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 866. 
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Interestingly, the State never complained that appellate counsel failed to 
adequately brief the plain language analysis. Rather, the State cited to other cases that 
had interpreted the phrase "not amounting to" and urged this Court to disregard that 
language. State's Brief at 11. Because Mr. Silvaz argued that the plain language of the 
Internet enticement statute was contradictory, interpretations of other statutes were not 
relevant to this appeal. Again, if the plain language of a statute controls, courts may not 
look beyond the statute to other sources of information. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 866. 
Even if the cases the State cited were relevant, appellate counsel thoroughly 
addressed and distinguished them in his reply brief. Nevertheless, this Court again 
faulted appellate counsel for "providing] no analysis in support of his claim" that 
"attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are not greater offenses." Addendum A at 2. This 
Court appears to have "misapprehended" the arguments detailed in the reply brief. Utah 
R. App. P. 35(a). Mr. Silvaz distinguished the State's cases by arguing that they had not 
addressed the issue he raised on appeal ~ the contradictory requirements of the Internet 
enticement statute. Reply Brief at 3 (discussing State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68ffi[32-33, 8 
P.3d 1025; State v. Montova. 910 P.2d 441, 444 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Peters, 
550 P.2d 1999, 199-200 (Utah 1976)). Mr. Silvaz further distinguished these cases by 
arguing that the policy behind them of encouraging the filing of more serious charges did 
not apply to the Internet enticement statute. Specifically, Mr. Silvaz cited to the penalties 
for attempt, conspiracy, solicitation, and Internet enticement and correctly noted that all 
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four offenses punish offenders one degree lower than the underlying offense. Reply Brief 
at 3-4 (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102 (1999); 76-4-202 (1999); 76-4-204 (1999); 76-
4-401(3) (Supp. 2002)). Thus, this Court erroneously concluded that appellate counsel 
f,provide[d] no analysis in support of his claim." Addendum A at 2. 
Because Mr. Silvaz thoroughly analyzed the State's cases in the reply brief, 
implicit in this Court's conclusion that the briefs failed to analyze the State's cases 
appears to be the assumption that appellate counsel was at fault for not listing the State's 
cases in the opening brief. As discussed, Mr. Silvaz did not cite those cases because they 
addressed totally different statutes that had no applicability here. Even if those cases did 
apply, Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) specifically authorizes reply briefs "to answer [] 
any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." Mr. Silvaz's reply brief accomplished 
that very purpose and responded to the State's arguments. Further, Mr. Silvaz argued in 
reply that the State's cases directly conflicted with Nelson's requirement to refer 
contradictory statutes to the legislature. Reply Brief at 4 (citing Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876). 
Requiring appellants to raise all possible arguments in the opening brief creates an 
impossible standard and a trap for the unwary. Such a rule would effectively require 
appellants to raise all conceivable arguments, even if they do not apply, in the opening 
brief or risk losing appellate review. The briefing process contemplates that parties may 
not identify every argument and so it allows each side an opportunity to respond to the 
other side and to raise new issues. This process is designed to provide this Court the 
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"research and argument" necessary to make an informed decision without dumping that 
burden on this Court. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. The briefs here accomplished these 
purposes of identifying the plain language argument, listing the relevant legal authorities, 
and applying the law to the Internet enticement statute. No more should be required. 
The Rules of Professional Conduct support this conclusion. Rule 3.3 requires 
counsel "to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to 
the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3) (emphasis added). Because lawyers 
will not always catch controlling authority, counsel only acts unethically when he or she 
knows of controlling authority and opposing counsel fails to disclose it. Thus, raising 
applicable case law in a reply brief is appropriate because the reply presents the first 
opportunity at which a party knows opposing counsel has failed to cite controlling 
authority. This approach accurately describes the very process that occurred here. 
The briefs similarly informed this Court of the relevant law and issues concerning 
the vagueness challenge to the Internet enticement statute. First, the opening brief details 
three separate tests for challenging a statute as unconstitutionally vague. Opening Brief at 
26-27. The brief then identified the controlling law on the vagueness doctrine. Id at 27. 
Because trial counsel did not specifically raise a vagueness challenge, the brief argued 
that the trial court committed plain error in not ruling that the Internet enticement statute 
was unconstitutionally vague. Id at 27 n.2. 
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This Court held that because the briefs did not adequately address the test for plain 
error, Mr. Silvaz had HCdump[ed] the burden of argument and research' on this court. 
Addendum A at 2 (quoting Thomas. 961 P.2d at 305 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)). Again, this Court misconstrued Mr. Silvaz's arguments. Utah R. App. P. 
35(a). Because the briefs had already explained that the Internet enticement statute was 
internally inconsistent, appellate counsel reasoned that the statute did not satisfy the 
definition of vagueness of being ,u sufficiently clear and definite to inform persons of 
ordinary intelligence what their conduct must be to conform to the'" requirements of the 
law. Opening Brief at 27 (quoting State v. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321, 1322 (Utah 1986) 
(internal quotation omitted)). Assuming that he had already explained the hopelessly 
confusing nature of the statute, appellate counsel decided not to rehash the same 
arguments to avoid filing a repetitious, lengthy brief. Accordingly, appellate counsel 
directly applied the Internet enticement statute to the three tests for vagueness and argued 
that each test was met. Id at 28-30. The opening brief even analogized the statute to a 
criminal statute from Louisiana that contained similarly contradictory language. LI at 29-
30 (discussing State v. Lambert. 514 So. 2d 550 (La. Ct. App. 1987)). 
In further effort to streamline the brief, appellate counsel argued that the plain 
error doctrine rendered the Internet enticement statute "obviously contradictory" and, 
therefore, vague. Id at 27 n.2. Because Mr. Silvaz was convicted based on an invalid 
statute, he argued that a more favorable outcome was not only likely, but certain. IdL 
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In sum, the briefs clearly identified three separate theories for rendering the 
Internet enticement statute vague, explained that the statute was so confusing that it failed 
to satisfy each of the tests for vagueness, and provided authorities in support of each of 
those arguments. Further, the briefs applied the plain error doctrine to the arguments. 
Because the briefs contained "reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority," they 
met this Court's briefing requirements. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, [^8, 995 P.2d 14. 
A survey of cases where Utah appellate courts have found inadequate briefing 
confirms that the briefing here was more than adequate under existing standards. This 
Court has reserved findings of inadequate briefing for cases that are particularly 
"egregious." Rosendahl v. Rosendahl 876 P.2d 870, 876 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994). For 
example, this Court deemed as deficient briefs that "wholly failfed] to discuss an essential 
element of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine." State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 150 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). This Court has similarly faulted briefs that created a "complete 
inability" to review the merits of the arguments given the lack of legal authority, reasoned 
analysis, and argument. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,1fi[9-l5, 995 P.2d 14. Copies of 
portions of the actual briefs from these cases are included in the Addendum. 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has found inadequate briefing where the briefs 
"wholly lack[ed] legal analysis and authority . . . [and] totally fail[ed] to provide any 
reasons to support the contention. . . . " State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989). In similarly strong language, the Supreme Court faulted briefs that contained 
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"bald assertions" and "wholly" omitted citation to authority and analysis of that authority. 
Thomas. 961 P.2d at 305. A copy of the Thomas brief is also included in the Addendum. 
In contrast to these briefs, the briefs here identified the issues presented, cited 
relevant authorities in support of the issues, and applied the law to the Internet enticement 
statute. The briefing process disclosed all of the relevant law that this Court needed to 
address the merits of the statute and fully responded to the State's arguments and 
authorities. Even if the brief process failed to reveal all relevant authorities, "the overall 
analysis of the issue[s] [were not] so lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to" this Court. Icl This Court's conclusion that the briefing was inadequate 
creates a higher briefing standard that requires near perfect rather than adequate briefing. 
II. THIS COURT'S REFUSAL TO ADDRESS THE MERITS 
OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS DEPRIVED HIM OF 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON APPEAL 
Even if appellate counsel failed to adequately brief the issues, this Court's decision 
not to address the merits of this appeal deprived Mr. Silvaz of his constitutional rights on 
appeal. Both state and federal constitutional protections provide criminal defendants the 
right to a meaningful appeal. Criminal defendants do not forfeit this right when counsel 
fails to follow appellate court rules. Rather than dismissing the appeal and thereby 
penalizing criminal defendants for counsel's actions, the right to appeal demands that this 
Court take affirmative steps to preserve defendants' appeal rights. 
Both the Utah and the Federal Constitutions preserve criminal defendants' state 
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constitutional righc to an "'adequate and effective' appeal." Evitts v. Lucev, 469 U.S. 387 
393 (1985) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)). Article I, section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution grants accused persons "the right to appeal in all cases." Because 
the right to appeal is "essential to a fair criminal proceeding" this right must "be carefully 
protected by the courts." State v. Turtle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). Although the 
Federal Constitution does not provide for a right to an appeal, when a state establishes 
such a right, "the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution." Evitts. 469 U.S. at 
393. These clauses require the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants and the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. IdL at 393-97. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that courts cannot deprive criminal 
defendants of the right to an appeal when counsel fails to follow court rules. In Evitts, 
appellate counsel's failure to file a required statement of appeal resulted in the dismissal 
of the appeal. 469 U.S. at 389-90. The Supreme Court ruled that counsel's conduct 
deprived the defendant of appellate counsel because "it essentially waived respondent's 
opportunity to make a case on the merits; in this sense, it is difficult to distinguish 
respondent's situation from that of someone who had no counsel at all." Id at 394 n.6. 
The right to appeal under the Utah Constitution requires even more. In Utah, 
appellate courts must preserve the right to appeal to prevent it from being "lightly 
forfeited." Turtle, 713 P.2d at 794. Rather, "courts generally indulge every reasonable 
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presumption against waiver of such a right." Bruner v. Carver. 920 P.2d 1153, 1155 
(Utah 1996). The "State ha[s] the burden of proving a knowing and willing 
relinquishment of the right to appeal. . . . " Li at 1156. 
Like in Evitts, this Court's refusal to address the merits of this appeal, deprived 
Mr. Silvaz of the right to counsel on appeal and the right to appeal itself. By summarily 
concluding that the briefs were inadequate and refusing to address the merits of Mr. 
Silvaz's challenges to the Internet enticement statute, this Court's decision "essentially 
waived [Mr. Silvaz's] opportunity to make a case on the merits." Evitts, 469 at 394 n.6. 
Absent the State proving a "knowing and willing" waiver of the right to appeal, this court 
cannot deprive Mr. Silvaz of that right. Bruner, 920 P.2d at 1155. 
Numerous courts agree that refusing to address the merits of an appeal based on 
counsel's failure to follow court rules deprives criminal defendants of their appeal rights. 
In Norman v. State, 916 S.W.2d 724, 724 (Ark. 1996) (per curiam), appellate counsel 
failed to perfect an appeal by neglecting to tender the trial court record to the appellate 
court, resulting in dismissal. Id The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled, however, that "[t]he 
direct appeal of a conviction is a matter of right, and a state cannot penalize a criminal 
defendant by dismissing his first appeal as of right when his appointed counsel has failed 
to follow mandatory appellate rules." Id 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Frank, 680 N.E.2d 67, 69 (Mass. 1997), the 
appellate court dismissed an appeal because counsel failed to pursue an appeal after filing 
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the notice of appeal. Ruling that the defendant "was deprived of his appeal," that court 
concluded that counsel's failure to prosecute the appeal was the same as if the defendant 
"'had no counsel at all.'" Id at 69 (quoting Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394 n.6). Further, 
"appellant was effectively denied his right to a direct appeal when original counsel failed 
to brief or argue timely filed post-verdict motions." Commonwealth v. Ciotto. 555 A.2d 
930, 931 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
Because this Court's decision effectively deprived Mr. Silvaz of his appeal rights, 
the only remaining question is how to remedy the denial of those rights. In Evitts, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that state courts may only dismiss an appeal for an 
attorney's rule violations "if such action does not intrude upon the client's due process 
rights." 469 U.S. at 399. The state must afford the defendant an "appeal as of r ight . . . to 
assure that only those who are validly convicted have their freedom drastically curtailed." 
Id. at 399-400. "A State may not extinguish this right because another right of the 
appellant - the right to effective assistance of counsel ~ has been violated." IdL at 400. 
The Utah Constitution provides criminal defendants even greater protection 
because they have "the right to appeal in all cases." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Thus, any 
remedy for rules violations cannot deprive criminal defendants of this constitutional right 
to appeal. Rather, "less drastic means are available to correct" the failure to adequately 
brief an appeal. Commonwealth v. Ely, 554 A.2d 118, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
The most efficient way to correct a rule violation without infringing on appeal 
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rights is to order appellate counsel to comply with the appellate rules. Norman, 916 
S.W.2d at 724. Here, for example, rather than dismissing the appeal and refusing to 
address the merits, this Court could have easily ordered appellate counsel to supplement 
the briefs. This approach avoids delay and effectively corrects the problem. Ely, 554 
A.2d at 119. Rather than "penalizing] a criminal defendant by dismissing" the appeal, 
the fairest approach would be to give existing counsel an opportunity to correct deficient 
briefs. Norman, 916 S.W.2d at 724; see also Erb v. State. 332 A.2d 137 (Del. 1974) 
(ordering appellate counsel to submit new briefs); Burton v. State, 455 N.E.2d 938 (Ind. 
1983) (directing counsel to re-brief); Turner v. State. 818 So. 2d 1186 (Miss. 2001) 
(ordering re-briefmg). Utah appellate courts, for example, have allowed parties to amend 
incomplete docketing statements. Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1987); Brooks v. Industrial Common, 736 P.2d 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Should 
this Court feel a need to enforce its appellate rules more stringently, the order to re-brief 
could be accompanied by sanctions on the attorney, where appropriate. Evitts, 469 U.S. 
at 399; Ciotto. 555 A.2d at 931 n.l. 
Other courts have remedied rules violations without denying appeal rights by 
granting the defendant an appeal nunc pro tunc. People v. Valenzuela, 222 Cal. Rptr. 405 
(Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds. People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869, 880 (Cal. 
1998); Ciotto, 555 A.2d at 931. State high courts have also remanded appeals to a lower 
appellate court to rehear the appeal de novo. People v. Gonzales, 393 N.E.2d 987 (N. Y. 
14 
1979). Other courts, including this Court, have dismissed appellate counsel and ordered 
the appointment of new counsel. People v. Barton, 579 P.2d 1043, (Cal. 1978); People v. 
Henry, 532 N.Y.S.2d 155 (App. Div. 1988); Ely, 554 A.2d at 119; Qgden City v. Stites. 
2002 UT App 357, p , 58 P.3d 865. 
Simply dismissing an appeal without remedying the loss of appeal rights, as this 
Court did in this case, defeats criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Presumably, 
criminal defendants could file some sort of petition for post-conviction relief to claim the 
denial of appeal rights. State v. Johnson. 635 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Utah 1981). But, as 
pointed out in Evitts, criminal defendants generally lack knowledge of legal proceedings 
that are "governed by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hopelessly forbidding." 
469 U.S. at 396. Given the complexities of post-conviction proceedings, this Court 
cannot simply hope that the defendant somehow learns of possible remedies. Rather, this 
Court must specifically direct the defendant how to proceed to ensure that defendants 
receive their appeal rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Silvaz requests this Court to rehear this appeal and to address to the merits of 
his challenges to the Internet enticement statute. 
SUBMITTED this ^ d a y of February, 2003. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Raymond F. Silvaz appeals his conviction for the second 
degree felony of enticing a minor over the internet with intent 
to commit a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-401 (Supp. 2 0 02) (Enticement Statute) We affirm. 
Silvaz first argues the Enticement Statute is so internally 
inconsistent that it deprived him of notice of a crime, Under 
the Enticement Statute, 
[a] person commits enticement of a minor over 
the [i]nternet when, not amounting to an 
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation under 
Section 76-4-101, 76-4-201, or 76-4-203, the 
person knowingly uses a computer to solicit, 
seduce, lure, or entice, or attempt to 
solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a 
person the defendant believes to be a minor 
to engage in any sexual activity which is a 
violation of state criminal law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (emphasis added). Silvaz claims 
this statute "requires the State to prove both the nonexistence 
and the existence of the same crime" by "requir[ing] the State to 
prove that a person has not committed the crimes of attempt, 
conspiracy, or solicitation but then obligat[ing] the State to 
show that a person has used a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, 
or entice a minor or has attempted to do so." However, Silvaz 
fails to cite the attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation statutes 
and fails to explain how any are the same as "knowingly us[ing] a 
computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or attempt to 
solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor . . . ." Id. 
Further, Silvaz fails to adequately address case law on the 
Enticement Statute's "not amounting to" language, which is 
contrary to his position. See State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68,^33, 8 
P.3d 1025 (noting "'the only rule that is realistic and makes 
sense'" regarding a statute with similar "not amounting to" 
language "'is that the State need prove only that which it has 
charged and should be able to ignore proof as to lack of any 
greater offense to which the accused just may be required to 
respond'" (citing State v. Peters, 550 P.2d 199, 199-200 (Utah 
1976))); see also State v. Montova, 910 P.2d 441, 445 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). In distinguishing prior case law, Silvaz claims 
attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are not greater offenses 
than internet enticement, yet provides no analysis in support of 
his claim. Because Silvaz's analysis "is so lacking as to shift 
the burden of research and argument" to this court, we refuse to 
reach the merits of his claim. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) . 
Silvaz next claims the Enticement Statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. This issue is raised for the first 
time on appeal, requiring a showing of plain error or exceptional 
circumstances. See State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) (noting constitutional arguments fall under the rules 
for plain error). In a footnote, Silvaz insists the Enticement 
Statute satisfies the three plain error requirements, see State 
v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,16, 18 P. 3d 1123, "because it is 
obviously contradictory and is, therefore, vague." By failing to 
provide any further plain error analysis, Silvaz improperly 
ffdump[s] the burden of argument and research" on this court, and 
we therefore dismiss Silvaz's claim. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Third, Silvaz challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented to the jury regarding Silvaz's state of mind. Silvaz's 
brief makes only a cursory reference to "[t]he marshaled evidence 
supporting the conviction," with an incomplete listing of trial 
evidence favoring the prosecution. Thus, Silvaz fails his 
marshaling burden to "present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
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order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
. . . support[ing] the very findings the appellant resists." 
West Vallev Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). We therefore do not reach this claim. 
Finally, Silvaz argues the prosecution tainted the jury's 
verdict with prejudicial comments during its closing argument. 
"Because [Silvaz] did not object [at trial], we review the 
[prosecution's] comments for plain error." State v. Baker, 963 
P.2d 801, 804 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Thus, Silvaz-must show, 
among other things, the existence of an error that "should have 
been obvious to the trial court." Id. at 803 (quotations and 
citation omitted). In its closing argument the prosecution 
stated: 
What we don't have evidence of is these 
friends who told [Silvaz] what to say [during 
the internet communication]. That's 
convenient. We don't know who these friends 
are, we don't know what they hounded him to 
say. That's all convenient. That's exactly 
what probably should be said, I don't think 
it was a kid, I didn't think I was going to 
actually do anything. That's not what's 
important. 
Silvaz construes these statements as referring to Silvaz's 
failure to call his online friends as witnesses, without the 
prosecution obtaining an "advance[d] ruling from the trial 
court." State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1989) 
(quotations and citation omitted). According to Silvaz, this 
violation of the "missing witness rule" was "clear" and thus 
should have been obvious to the trial court. 
In looking to "the totality of the evidence presented at 
trial," State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118 (Utah Ct. App.'1995) 
(quotations and citation omitted), the prosecution's comments 
were not "obvious" error. At trial, Silvaz testified that three 
online friends coaxed him into much of his discussion with the 
police decoy, including questions about "his sexual preference" 
and "what kind of stuff he liked to do." On cross-examination, 
Silvaz refused to give the friends' names, and on redirect 
explained he was reluctant to give them "[b]ecause they [did not] 
want to be mentioned in the news." The prosecution's statements 
could have referred to this testimony, rather than Silvaz*s 
failure to call his "friends" as witnesses. Given this 
reasonable interpretation, there was no obvious error and 
Silvaz's claim fails. See Baker, 963 P.2d at 805 (finding 
20020298-CA 3 
ambiguity in interpreting prosecution's closing statements a 
factor in finding no plain error). 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
<U.< 
Norman H. Jackson,"" 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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motivated by the desire to find contraband. In short, no "pretext inventory search" 
analysis should apply. To the contrary, sound law holds that so long as an inventory 
search is conducted in compliance with standardized policy, it is proper under the Fourth 
Amendment. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,378-81 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring); Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987-89. Because the inventory search in this case 
was conducted in compliance with the applicable police policy, it was proper. The trial 
court's judgment on this point should be affirmed. 
B. The Mitsubishi's Passenger Compartment Was Properly Searched 
Incident to Montoya's Arrest 
Even if this Court were to condemn the inventory search, it would not 
follow, as Montoya demands, that "all items seized from the vehicle must be suppressed" 
(Br. of Appellant at 38). There are alternative grounds upon which the trial court's denial 
of Montoya's motion to suppress can be affirmed. As explained in State v. South, 
P.2d , 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5 (Utah 1996), the "affirm on any proper ground" 
principle is a settled principle of appellate review. 
In this case, the State raises alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's 
judgment that were not raised in the trial court. The court in South stated: "We do not 
here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the 
lower court's judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court." South, 
298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6 n.3. However, in Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass 7J, 23 
17 
Utah 2d 222,461 P.2d 290 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court d\d mlili ess ili.it question, and 
•iTv- u nrd ii affirmatively. In Limb, the court held that a trial court judgment C-*M I «e 
affirmed on in the trial court, provided that the record supports such 
alternative ground. Limb, 461 P.2d at 293 In this case, there are record-supported 
alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's judgment. 
The first such alternative ground addresses only the search of the 
Mitsubishi'1 pas.sen^ 11 compartment, where the spoon and syringe were found. That 
search was proper incident to Montoya's lawful arrest for public intoxication. The scope 
of such a search properly extends to the passenger i m p \y\\>i,n» oi a recently-occupied 
automobile, even if the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed ii> n iln t h h: is 
occurred in IIus L IM See State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.) (thorough review 
3The cited footnote in Limb addressed Justice Henric 
The dissent in this case is without merit. The law is well settled that a trial court should 
be affirmed if on the record made it can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal 
& Error § 1464(1) as follows: "* * * The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, 
or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be 
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not 
urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not 
considered or passed on by the lower court. * * *" 
461 P.2d at 203 n.2. The footnote went on to explain that while a judgment can be affirmed on 
any proper ground, it will not be reversed on grounds not advanced in the trial court. Id. This 
latter rule is tempered, however, by the modem rule of "plain error," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201,1208 (Utah 1993). The "plain error" rule, which aids appellants, counterbalances the 
appellee-aiding "affirm on any ground" rule. 
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'search incident to arrest19 cases and authority), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 
?6); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (the leading case). 
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Montoya admitted that he had 
iven the Mitsubishi to the Seven-Eleven store (R. 128). Lacking adequate pocket 
oney to complete his purchase, he went back out to the Mitsubishi to retrieve some 
ore money (R. 128-29). Just as he got out of the car and was heading back into the 
ore, Officers Gill and Schmidt arrived (R. 129). Thus the Mitsubishi had been recently 
ccupied by Montoya when he was arrested, and its passenger compartment was, under 
ioreno and its underpinning authority, properly searched incident to Montoya's arrest. 
lierefore, the spoon and syringe seized during that search are admissible evidence, 
;upporting at least partial affirmance of the trial court's judgment. 
C. The Mitsubishi Was Properly Searched Due to Probable Cause and 
Exigent Circumstances. 
As the second alternative ground for affirmance, the entire Mitsubishi was 
properly searched due to the existence of probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
contained contraband, coupled with exigent circumstances. The "probable cause plus 
exigent circumstances" search justification is a settled exception to the warrant 
requirement. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,569 (1991); State v. Anderson, 
910 P.2d 1229,1237 (Utah 1996). Both probable cause and exigent circumstances are 
determined with respect to the totality of the circumstances, or "mosaic of evidence/5 
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underlying medical and psychological examinations, including "reports of all earlier 
examinations." 
3. Denial of fundamental rights constitutes a denial of the Constitutional 
right of due process. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Permitting an expert witness to testify and provide evidence to the Court upon secret, 
concealed and undisclosed information, data, records or documents is a violation of due 
process and in violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A fundamental theory underlying the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and enabling 
Acts is that citizens, whether in civil or criminal matters, may not be accused, found at 
fault, or convicted upon secret, concealed and undisclosed information, data, records, 
documents, or witnesses. 
It was Kevin who requested that the Court appoint Dr. Gully as an "independent 
evaluator" to conduct a "psychological evaluation" of Rosie and to submit a written 
report directly to the Court and to appear as an expert witness at trial. 
Information, data, records, and documents have been collected on this matter for 
a number of years, at least since 1993. In addition, the IHC report reveals that Gully 
received information from Kevin, conducted his own investigation, had access to and 
used present and historical undisclosed, unrevealed, and unexamined medical reports 
and other data. 
Kevin took the position that Rosie must not be privy to the nature, source, or 
content of any data underlying the accusations made against her, completely depriving 
her, her counsel, and other medical professionals of access to any underlying 
data—data upon which Rosie has been accused of malevolent wrong doing—data 
upon which ultimate conclusions were made and upon which Rosie has been accused 
and deprived of parental rights. 
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Even if the information gathered and conclusions drawn by Gully were true, other 
than the data underlying the Gully Report, there is no expert or medical evidence upon 
which Rosie may be accused. 
Medical and psychological evaluations require access to a patient's history. In 
this case there must be open access to both historical and current medical data. A 
physician, psychiatrist, or psychologist who gives an opinion without access to the foil 
record would simply lack credibility. 
If the protective orders had been requested, made and issued at Dr. Gully's 
insistence, thereby concealing his basic underlying scientific data, then he would be 
subject to attack as a person who would make himself that sole expert—one not subject 
to question or review. In other words, if the only person having access to any data 
collected by Dr. Gully was and remained only in his possession, such date must be 
rejected in the scientific community because such date is neither replicable nor subject 
to peer review. However, strangely, IHC or Gully requested none of the protective 
orders. 
All protective orders and all requisite documentation upon which they were 
based was prepared by opposing counsel—Kevin's counsel. 
Without some improper extensive interaction and ongoing private 
communications between Kevin and Hardman, how would Kevin even know who, what, 
where, when or how to object? How would Kevin even know to object to the release of 
documents, data, medical reports, and information which supposedly and solely within 
the "independent" custody, possession, and control of IHC? 
Rosie did not submit the first Subpoena Duces Tecum to or through Kevin nor 
his counsel. That Subpoena was submitted solely and directly to IHC. How did 
Kevin's counsel even know of the Subpoena, let alone—how did Kevin's counsel, 
Hardman, and Guardian ad Litem even know, jointly and severally, that they should 
claim that release of any information would "be damaging to the children?" 
How? Why? How did Kevin's counsel find out about the Subpoena Duces 
Tecum? The only answer must be that either Dr. Gully or Ms. Hardman, the social 
worker, took it upon themselves to call and inform opposing counsel. Why? Given the 
information in the next two paragraphs—the most likely informant was Ms. Hardman. 
Why? 
How is any person deemed "independent" who obviously is maintaining 
ongoing direct communications with the opposing parties or counsel? How can any 
person be "independent" who requested that legal documents, a Motion for Protective 
Order and others, be prepared for him or her by Kevin's counsel? Ms. Hardman is an 
employee of IHC—a subordinate of Dr. Gully. How is such a person, Dr. Gully, Mr. 
Hardman or anyone else "independent" who seeks legal representation from opposing 
counsel as to the very case, matters and issues in question? 
Or—maybe Dr. Gully never made any such request. In fact, Dr. Gully never did! 
Solely Ms. Hardman, a social worker, made the only request—if any. And that request 
was made for and by her through opposing counsel. Nowhere in any request for any 
protective order does Dr. Gully's name appear. 
In fact, the Subpoena was only delivered to IHC late one Friday afternoon. Yet, 
Kevin's counsel, no later than the very next following Monday morning called Rosie's 
attorney demanding a copy. How did Kevin's counsel even know to ask for a copy that 
quickly? 
The answer is that the "psychological evaluation" was not "independent." The 
evaluation was not performed without the ongoing oversight and input of opposing 
counsel. That certainly is not "independent," not fair, not just, not lawful, nor in 
compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, nor in compliance the fundamental 
provisions of fairness and assured rights of an individual accused of wrongdoing. 
How did Kevin know that a request for a protective order should even be made? 
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The bottom line is that if Respondent chooses to have no evidence or underlying 
data brought forward or reviewed then this matter must be reversed and dismissed. The 
trial court exceeded its discretion in actively participating in the prevention of discovery 
and in permitting witnesses to testify upon unexamined out-of-court and secret 
information. 
POINT 2 
The trial court's concealment of relevant information through issuance of all requested 
protective orders constitutes a violation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
exceeds the discretion and authority of the court at the trial level. 
The 1967 Utah case of Ellis v. Gilbert, sets down the purpose of the rules of 
discovery: 
The purposes of discovery rules are to make discovery as simple and 
efficient as possible by eliminating any unnecessary technicalities, and to 
remove elements of surprise or trickery so that the parties and the court 
can determine the facts and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and 
expeditiously as possible.51 
By not permitting the trial court to maintain the secrecy of information through 
issuance of multiple orders which flatly deny discovery, the Court of Appeals, by 
overturning both the final order of the trial court and the interim protective orders, will 
assure that the interests of the parties and the children involved proceed in accordance 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellate supervision of the trial court is required. 
The trial court violated its discretion and judicial obligation to supervise the 
administration of justice. The trial court failed to bring before it the most reliable 
witnesses and information. The trial court flatly refused discovery. The trial court 
violated its discretion in repeatedly denying any discovery. It was argued at the time of 
trial that Appellant made no attempt to take Dr. Gully's deposition. That is correct 
51
 Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967) 
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because attempting to take a deposition under an order which refused access to any 
underlying data would be an expensive venture into the ridiculous. 
The trial court violated its discretion and its obligation to assure that the 
interests of the parties and the children involved will proceed with fundamental fairness, 
without unnecessary technicalities, removing elements of surprise and trickery. 
By the trial court entering an order, permitting an eminent expert to review all 
information, granting broad authority to Dr. Rindflesh to inquire into the matter, will 
have no adverse impact upon the proceedings. Dr. Rindflesh's inquiry may resolve the 
entire matter. There should be no fear of peer review. 
At the trial level, if any party ever really feared that release of any information 
may be harmful to the children it may have been appropriate to direct that release of 
information shall be made directly to Dr. Rindflesh and Rosie's counsel alone. The 
problem was that the trial court opted to prohibit everything—the trial court issued a 
number of orders that established an absolute prohibition against discovery—against 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Point 3 
The trial court action in violation of Rule 35(b)(R URCivP that requires disclosure of 
data underlying a court ordered psychological examination 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, on or about July 17, 1997, Kevin filed a 
Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce, requesting a court ordered 
"psychological evaluation."52 Rule 35(b)(1), URCivP, requires that: 
If requested by a party against whom an order is made under Rule 35(a) or 
the person examined, the party causing the examination to be made shall 
deliver to the person examined and/or the other party a copy of a detailed 
written report of the examination setting out the examiner's findings, 
including results of all tests made, diagnosis and conclusions, together 
with like reports of all earlier examination of the same condition. 
52
 (Record, 919-926) Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce, July 17, 1997, 
page 4. 
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In the case at hand the trial court granted the motion for a psychological 
evaluation and then prohibited the person examined, Rosie, her counsel and her medical 
experts from having any access to even the basic documents of testing, let alone the 
detail. The trial court exceeded its discretion in issuing protective orders against the 
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT 4 
Under the provisions of Rule 26(b)(3), URCivP. Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought. 
The information, underlying the Gully Report, should be subject to review. That 
information has been collected and paid for by both parties. The information has been 
collected under direction of the Court and is the only source of information as to the 
medical treatment of the children and basic facts of this matter. The court appointed Dr. 
Gully and his IHC staff, supposedly as an "independent evaluators." None of the 
information collected or in the possession of IHC may be considered the work product 
of opposing counsel. 
The information requested, reflecting and being the only source of information as 
to medical and psychological evaluations of the children and under which Rosie was 
required to submit in this matter are material and directly relevant to the issues of the 
case and are essential to the preparation of Rosie's experts for trial. Said documents 
requested will reflect the information received and generated by the Child Protection 
Team on this matter and upon which conclusions were made and upon which it is 
expected that Rosie's experts will testify at trial. 
Rule 26(b)(3), URCivP, provides that: 
Subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule [related to 
preparation of experts], a party may obtain discovery of documents and 
tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this 
rule [related to the general scope of discovery] and prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial. ... Upon a showing that the party 
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation 
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of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. 
Rule 26(b)(3), URCivP, is applicable to production of documents and 
discoverable information produced by private experts called and paid by an opposing 
counsel. In this matter, Dr. Gully was appointed, supposedly as an independent 
investigator. Data upon which an independent report is submitted directly to the court 
should be freely available to all parties. At a minimum, all data under the disclosure 
requirements of Rule 35(b)(1), URCivP, should have been met. Yet the trial court issued 
orders completely prohibiting discovery. 
The information requested to be released to Dr. Rindflesh and the granting of the 
relief sought would have given a unquestioned and well respected medical expert 
access to the only data underlying the written report and testimony before the trial 
court. The opposing parties are hiding—in collusion with someone on the IHC 
staff—refusing to release any of the underlying data. That fact makes the Gully Report 
suspect and questionable. That fact implies that something is wrong. "What and 
why"—that must be the question. 
Being subject to question, the Gully Report makes the conclusion that Rosie's 
unrestricted visitation with her children constitutes a danger to both Natalie and Emilie 
because of Rosie's psychological and emotional problems. Continuing to require that 
Rosie attempt to blindly engage her own separate experts, places an enormous burden 
upon Rosie or any other person, particularly a person of limited means. Further, to do 
so without access to past medical records and history is impossible. 
Without any knowledge of the fiill information collected by Dr. Gully and within 
the IHC files, it would be impossible to duplicate and assure that the same basic 
information be available to all parties. It must be remembered that Dr. Gully, IHC, Ms. 
Hardman and their associates were appointed at the specific request of Kevin. Rosie 
has been required to pay one-half of the cost. Dr. Gully has not acted under any 
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authority of and has not been hired solely by opposing counsel or solely by the office 
of Guardian ad Litem. The data underlying the Gully Report must not be kept secret. 
Not only that, under Rule 35(b)(1), URCivP, disclosure is required. 
Given the Statement of Facts set forth herein, a serious question is raised. Is 
there a possibility that a party or counsel may have acted without good faith? 
Opposing parties should not be permitted to refuse discovery or achieve de facto 
refiisal by trickery or intentional delay in violation of the Rules of Discovery. 
POINT 5 
The trial court violated the Constitutional right of due process—denying a fair trial. 
Appellant's right to fair trial, impartial access to the judiciary and to rely upon the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Evidence and the applicable case law. 
Fundamental rights are protected under the Utah Constitution.53 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Property embraces all valuable interests that a man may possess outside 
of himself, that is to say, outside of his life and liberty. It is not confined 
to mere tangible property, but extends to every species of vested right. 
McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 P.2d 608 (Utah 1938) 
The requirements of establishing the "plain error doctrine" is upon the Appellant 
and is set forth in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) as follows: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate 
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant 
must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. [Citations omitted] If any one of these requirements is not 
met, plaint error is not established. 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7 
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Appellant brought numerous motions before the trial courts and court 
commissioner in an attempt to obtain a fair hearing. All were denied on the most meager 
and unsupported conclusionary statement which were orchestrated by opposing 
counsel—a claim that permitting Appellant or her psychologists or her counsel, or her 
psychiatrist to have to have any access would "be damaging to the children." How? 
Why? No other explanation was ever given. That conclusionary statement and 
nothing more was the sole basis upon which the trial court took it upon itself to deny 
the very system upon which this nation arose—respect for the dignity and rights of the 
individual. Denial of a fair trial, denial of an open discovery process, denial of the right 
to counsel and denial of the right of counsel to prepare for trial—such things are 
fundamental. Denial of fundamental rights is plain and cumulative error. 
The trial court not only violated those fundamental rights but also, over 
objection, admitted testimony from its own appointed expert who had been specifically 
and singly requested by the opposing party. The trial court denied access to 
psychologists engaged by Appellant. This was thought to be a case of the trial judge 
possibly having insufficient personal regard for the Appellant's team of psychologists. 
Very fortunately Appellant had exceptionally good medical insurance through her 
employment. Appellant had been financially destroyed by that time. Only through her 
medical insurance was Appellant able to try to find a person with higher and 
unquestionable credentials—Dr. Rindflesh, MD, Psychiatrist, University of Utah. 
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Expert Testimony: 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in allowing the state's primary expert 
to comment on H.H.'s credibility, in violation of State v. Rimmasch, 775 
P.2d388 (Utah 1989)... In Rimmasch, our supreme court held that, absent 
foundation demonstrating the "inherent reliability" of the scientific basis 
for an expert's conclusion that a particular person was telling the truth on 
a particular occasion, an expert's opinion "based largely upon ... the 
expert's subjective appraisals of the [victim's] truthfulness during 
interviews" is not admissible. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 393, 406-07; see also 
State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1989) (finding error in admitting 
expert's bolstering testimony where "State did not qualify her as an expert 
on discerning truth"); State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 4480,485 (Utah 1989). 
State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (St. App. 1998) 
When Dr. Gully wrote in his report that he would choose to believe Steve 
Schermerhom, at least inferring that Dr. Card and other peer professionals would 
possibly lie as to words which Steve had spoken in Dr. Card's office, Dr. Gully certainly 
was not qualified as an expert on discerning truth. 
CONCLUSION 
Even the trial court itself finally had to acknowledge that no argument could be 
maintained against having Dr. Rindflesh review all information under the terms and 
conditions suggested. Further, the previously issued orders, which prohibited access 
to Rosie, her counsel, and her psychologists, were likewise indefensible. But even the 
apparent prejudice of the trial court had to give way to the recognition that its actions 
could not support the denial of Rosie's Motion in Limine. Surprisingly, on the morning 
of trial, the trial court's order, given just five (5) working days earlier, was seen as a 
sham. Reasonable time to comply with the trial court's order was denied. The trial was 
forced forward. 
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ADDENDUM D 
. . . The court must a l so note that the circumstances of 
th i s case do not readily suggest a waiver. This defendant was 
arrested at gun point and taken to the p o l i c e s t a t i o n . There, he 
was confronted by a ver i tab le array of o f f i c e r s from several 
d i f ferent law enforcement agencies , accompanied by the United 
States Attorney. Despite h i s requests to be allowed to c a l l h i s 
attorney, he was not permitted t o do so u n t i l h i s arraignment the 
following day. Under the circumstances, any withdrawal of the 
defendant's original i n s i s t e n c e that h i s attorney be present 
should not be l i g h t l y inferred. 
Mr. Thomas should have been afforded an opportunity to use 
2 telephone and consult with his a t torney. Instead, his wil l 
3 broken and he was coerced in to making incriminating 
atements. 
No system worth preserving should have to fear that i f an accused 
i s permitted to consult with a lawyer, he w i l l become aware of, 
and exerc i s e , these r i g h t s . If the exerc i se of cons t i tu t iona l 
r ights w i l l thwart the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a system of law 
enforcement, then there i s something very wrong with that system. 
cobedo v . I l l i n o i s , 378 U . S . 478 , 490 ( 1 9 6 4 ) . 
The P o l i c e misconduct i n t h i s c a s e , and t h e c o n t i n u i n g t a i n t 
t h a t mi sconduc t i n c o m p e l l i n g Mr. Thomas t o make i n c r i m i n a t i n g 
a t e m e n t s , r e q u i r e s t h a t Mr. Thomas ' s s t a t e m e n t s be s u p p r e s s e d . 4 6 
V I I 
THE PHOTO ARRAY THE POLICE USED WAS OVERLY SUGGESTIVE 
Although motions to suppress the photo array were denied. 
Findings of fac t s , R. 526-552], a t the t r i a l i t became c lear tha t 
he witness ' ident i f ica t ion was the r e s u l t of the overly 
uggestive photo array. Under cross-examination the Prosecution's 
ta r witness, Mr. Kimball, admitted that the way the photo array 
'The Pol ice made iio recording, e l ec tron ic or wri t ten of the a l l eged 
confession. [R. 854-1026](Tr. pp 314-19] . 
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was presented, he had to chose Mr. Thomas as the robber. [R. 639-
853] Tr. pp. 155-57. Exhibit A. 
Q. The gentleman you saw that evening, sir, was that— did you see 
whether or not the gentleman had a mustache? 
A. He had no facial hair. 
[R. 854-1026]; Tr. p. 149, Exhibit A. 
Q. (by Mr. De Montreux) at some point while you were testifying 
this afternoon you were presented, sir, with a photo lineup, and 
from that photo lineup you identified number two as the person who 
came to the Kentucky Fried Chicken that evening; is that correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And you also testified that there were six photos shown to you in 
that photo lineup; is that correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Earlier you also testified that on the night the person come into 
the Kentucky Fried Chicken— you testified the person who held you 
at gunpoint to have been clean shaven? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. !:ow, if I may borrow that photo lineup again and—your honor, if 
I may approach the witness. 
Q. (By Mr. De Montreux) let me ask you about number six, sir, in 
the photo lineup. Would you agree with me sir, the gentleman at 
number six has a mustache? 
A. Appears to be so, yes. 
Q. Okay. And should we go to number five, would you agree, again, 
this gentleman has a mustache? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Now at number four, will you again agree this gentleman has 
a mustache? 
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Yes, I do. 
At number one, would you agree, it appears as if the gentleman in 
photo number one has a mustache? 
I can't tell from that photo. 
In looking at his thick lips, we see he has a shadow in the 
mustache area. Is it possible that one could assume that 
gentleman has a mustache? 
It's hard to tell in this photo. I see a shadow. 
I have here an enlargement of this picture, if counsel does not 
have an objection. 
Stott: Yes, I'm going to object to an enlargement of the photo. 
If we're talking about what he observed at the time he made the 
identification, he did not see this. If we're talking about what 
appears to be a mustache, that photograph would have nothing to do 
with that because we have to go on what he saw at the time. 
De Montreux: Your honor, this is what he saw at the time. It's 
just enlarged in order to assist him in being sure, in order to 
help us seek the truth, the court: the objection is sustained. 
You can ask about what he saw in the photograph. 
De Montreux: Okay. Your honor, he answered my question which was 
he isn't sure whether or not that gentleman had a mustache. 
(by Mr. De Montreux) now, in looking at number two- which is 
the defendant in the courtroom, sir— would you agree with me 
that this picture does not show a mustache on this gentleman? 
No, it does not. 
Now, on number three there is a light skin black man, is that 
correct? 
Yes, it is. 
Now, would you agree with me that gentleman does not have a 
mustache in that picture? 
Yes, I would. 
Thank you. So, therefore, based on what you're looking at, would 
you agree with me that two of the gentlemen, which his number two 
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and number three, without any question in your mind, do not have a 
mustache? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, So, therefore, you would then agree with me that number 
one, number four, number five and number six failed to have what 
could be a mustache? 
A. Four, five and six does. Number one is hard to tell. 
Q. Hard to tell. And your testimony is that the person who came 
into the store was clean shaven? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And your testimony was it was a black man? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was not a light skinned black man, was it? 
A. No. 
Q. Not the one who came in the store? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Is it fair for me then to assume that this— with this 
photo lineup you only had to choose between two people, number two 
and number three? 
A. I say three people. Number one still could have been a 
possibility. 
Q. Okay. So, therefore, you would agree then that you had to choose 
between number one and number three? 
A. One and three, yes. 
Q. And would you agree with me that the gentlemen in number four, 
five and six do not resemble anything you saw that night? 
A. No. 
Q. As far as clean shaven? 
A. No, no, they don't. 
[R. 854-1026]; Tr. pp. 153-57, Exhibit A. 
The witness testified that a Black man, not a light skin 
Black man, held up the restaurant. The witness testified that the 
robber was clean shaven. The photo array presented 6 black men. 
Three of them had very defined mustaches. Tr. p. 155, lines 7-10. 
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The witness agreed that only two of the gentlemen, photo number 
two and photo number three did not have a mustache. Tr. p. 155, 
lines 2-6. The witness was logically left to chose between a very 
dark Mr. Thomas, featured at photo number three, and the light 
skin Black man at photo three. 
Under the circumstances, it is just to infer that the police 
expressly designed an overly suggestive photo array so the witness 
would have little or no choice but to select Mr. Thomas. That 
identification also taints any other identification of Mr. Thomas 
in violation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The overly 
suggestive photo array also violates Art. I, § 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution (Due process); see also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Thomas requests that his conviction be reversed on the 
grounds that Utah court commissioners did not have authority to 
play judicial roles in the case. The conviction should also be 
reversed on the other legal errors explained in this brief. 
Submitted this 20th day of May 1996. 
s^l O N T R M X F R E R E S , P . C . 
Bel^Ami Jean rfe Montreux \ 
Attorney for Appellant 1 
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